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Second Nature and the Sonic Sublime 
 
Miranda Stanyon, King’s College London 
 
I 
In 1759, the year he published the second, enlarged edition of Edmund Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry 
into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful, Robert Dodsley toured Wales, taking in the 
estate of Valentine Morris at Piercefield:  
The Place is certainly of the great and sublime Kind; most of the near Views are seen 
below you from the Top of high Precipices, consisting of steep Rocks, hanging 
Woods, the Rivers Severn and Wye, which last winds about the Feet of the Rocks 
below you, in a very romantic Manner. … The Rocks … rise almost perpendicular 
from the Edge of the Water to a surprising Height, forming, from the great Cliff a 
Kind of double Amphitheatre. A Gun fired from the Top of this Cliff, creates, by 
the Reverberation of the Report amongst other rocks, a loud Clap of Thunder, two 
or three Times repeated, before it dies away: but even this Echo, conformably to the 
Pride and Grandeur of the Rest of the Place, will not deign to answer a smaller Voice 
than that of a Musket; with a Culverin, I suppose, it would hold a noble Dialogue.1 
In characterizing this scene as “sublime” – aligned with the “great”, “romantic”, “surprising”, 
proud, grand, and “noble” – Dodsley is as much concerned with the sonic properties of space as 
with the elevated panoramic vantage point which allows him to safely survey the drop to rocks 
and rivers. Dodsley moves from sights to sounds: Sights locate the spectator and establish the 
landscape as a waiting stage (“a Kind of double Amphitheatre”); sounds set the space into dynamic 
movement, action and reaction. This tiny drama of “Reverberation” then takes the measure of 
nature in relation to human culture, using the fundamental techne of weaponry. Technicians still use 
guns to test the acoustic properties of buildings, and here sound gives the distanced spectators a 
literal “Report” on the space’s powers. But sound also establishes a more entangled rapport 
between natural power and human violence, a “Dialogue” which amplifies nature (“creat[ing]” a 
“loud Clap of Thunder” from a clear day) and affirms human pride.  
As Dodsley’s letter indicates, the space of the sublime, no less than any other space of 
enlightenment, was “a practiced place”.2 This goes for its rhetorical commonplaces, philosophical 
terrains, and physical environments. Dodsley draws on commonplaces of the sublime partly 
established by Burke’s treatise. He might remember Burke’s discussion of the sounds liable to 
provoke sublime fear: proxies for power, pain and danger like “cataracts”, “thunder”, “shouting” 
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crowds or animals’ “cries”, but also the “sudden”, “repeated”, or “intermitting” “stroke” of 
“clock”, “drum” or “cannon” (Dodsley’s imagined “Culverin” could itself be a cannon, or a hefty 
antiquated gun).3 Burke’s treatise, too, moved from sublime sights to sounds. Sound is treated 
more briefly, but, as we will see, offers an implicit model for the sublime’s underlying processes, 
one connected with practice and exercise. Dodsley’s travels in Wales are themselves part of 
emerging tourist practices calculated to provoke the sublime, including firing shots into echoic 
spaces. Physically, too, the eighteenth-century natural sublime relied on land “practiced,” shaped 
or framed by human action. Piercefield was no exception. Inherited by Morris in 1743, it was 
extensively reshaped and landscaped, and like nearby Tintern became a renowned tourist spot.  
At Piercefield, then, Dodsley meets what contemporaries would have called a “second 
nature,” in the sense of cultivated land. Intimately related to space, practice and habit, second nature 
is the expansive phrase at the center of this article. After sketching its history and counterintuitive 
relationship with the sublime, I explore points of contact between enlightenment sublimes and 
one particular philosophy of habit currently attracting renewed attention, that of Félix Ravaisson. 
My examples focus on overwhelming, indistinct limit sounds, and on a conceptualization of sound 
as a sublime phenomenon stretching beyond audibility to fill all space, and mark each body’s place 
in relation to others. I close by touching on second nature in a current ecocritical moment for the 
sublime. 
 
II 
When Michel de Certeau defined space as “practiced place,” he was interested in how individuals’ 
everyday uses and habits customized places – physical geographies and architectures – apparently 
authored and controlled by institutions and systems, and in so doing offered forms of resistance 
and counter-agency to those larger powers. His ethical vision finds expression in sonic tropes 
about the limits of the audible. The “ordinary man” to whom de Certeau dedicates his book 
represents an “impossible object” of research, his “voice … almost indistinguishable from the 
rumble of history,” a “hero” who “is the murmuring voice of societies” (v). The tropes reappear 
when de Certeau turns his attention to space. Here, he begins by setting the silent, panoramic 
perspective on New York city from the top of the World Trade Centre – a masterful perspective 
of totalizing knowledge and representation – against the “rumble of so many differences”, the 
traffic noises and “chorus of idle footsteps” characterizing lived experience down below (92, 97). 
De Certeau searches for a science of everyday practice whose only obvious point of contact 
with the sublime is its resistance to conceptualization and representation, classically aligned with 
sight. Indeed, the sublime seems a far cry from the everyday, practiced and habitual. True, as 
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Dodsley’s tour suggests, the sublime is a social practice – cultural not natural, encoding ideologies 
and hierarchies, associated with practiced poses and dispositions. From a rhetorical perspective, 
the sublime is structured by commonplaces, tropes, and figures. And from a post-Kantian 
perspective, everyday circumstances can certainly trigger the sublime, since sublimity names a 
structure of subjective experience, not (as with Dodsley) a category of objects. Nonetheless, surely 
the claim of the sublime is to be extraordinary, awe-inspiring, aporetic, epiphanic, non-habitual, 
natural? Yes and no. This is partly because “nature” has a curious status in habit and in the sublime, 
both of which have been seen to create a second nature. This capacious phrase can refer to the 
cultivation of land, the creation of artworks which imitate nature, or the processes of everyday 
habituation necessary and natural to human nature. In this way, “second nature” approaches 
“culture,” in the sense of the “webs of significance” humans “sp[i]n” for themselves, and within 
which we live “suspended.”4   
Conceptualizations of “culture” have strong connections with enlightenment and romantic 
discussion of habit, custom, and by extension prejudice. The classical idea of habit or custom as 
second nature became commonplace in the Renaissance, and debates around it intensified from 
the seventeenth century. In “Of Custom,” Montaigne paraphrased Pindar fragment 169a to the 
effect that habit was “Queen and Empress” of all.5 (Developing the dark implications of this image 
in the wake of the French Revolution, Shelley would call “Custom” “the Queen of Slaves / The 
hoodwinked Angel of the blind and dead”.6) Pascal thought custom a “second nature that destroys 
the former”, and suggested that, “as custom is a second nature, so nature itself is only a first 
custom” – an issue taken up by Hume, and anticipating more contemporary cultural 
constructivism.7 In 1794, the older Burke praised second nature in a way that suggests his reading 
of Hume and positive revaluation of prejudice: “Man, in his moral nature, becomes, in his progress 
through life, a creature of prejudice – a creature of opinions – a creature of habits, and of 
sentiments growing out of them. These form our second nature, as inhabitants of the country and 
members of the society in which Providence has placed us.”8  
Writing in the same year, from the other side of the political spectrum, William Blake 
participated in the modern attack on habit in Urizen. This fallen Eternal creates a slimy “Web” or 
“Net of Religion” which divides Urizen’s own children from the sight of eternity, until, their 
“shrunken eyes clouded over”, they “Discernd not the woven hypocrisy / But the streaky slime in 
their heavens / Brought together by narrowing perceptions / Appeard transparent air”, and they 
“forgot their eternal life”. In Urizen, this is what it means to become human, to have “eyes … like 
the eyes of a man”. Their perceptions “clouded” by the net, and the mesh of the net tightened by 
their “narrowing perceptions”, Urizen’s children act out the strange reciprocal creation of 
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socialized agents and social institutions – the latter represented as a physical environment 
coterminous with the skies.9 For the poem, both the space of the body and the limited (limiting) 
space of its external environment are secondary in an emphatically negative sense.  
Such negative attitudes towards second nature are familiar today, especially for critics 
following Kant or Marx.10 Habit is a problem, a blockage to change. This dovetails with a dominant 
contemporary notion of the sublime that finds a nice pop-culture parallel, as Matthew Head 
suggested to me, in the 1998 film The Truman Show. Jim Carey’s Truman slowly discovers that his 
habitual world is the product of a TV corporation, filming his life and manipulating it so carefully 
that they enclose his town in a bubble – with a painted sky he cannot even see until he bumps up 
against it in his efforts to escape. Here, the habitual is culture, with all its invisible forms, ideologies 
and conventions. Second nature must be punctured to glimpse what is formless, unmanageable, 
unconventional, and real. In recent theory, a key technology of this puncturing was the sublime, 
as it appeared in non-representational, formwidrig art. Such art cannot model a utopian space outside 
culture, but it can shock us out of our habits. Inhabiting this worldview, habit is harder to see as a 
positive constructive force, and we can miss its role in earlier conceptualizations of the sublime. 
Nevertheless, recent years have seen a recuperation of habit, associated especially with the 
French philosopher Félix Ravaisson (1813–1900). Ravaisson’s De l’habitude (1838), recently 
translated into English, has spawned a rash of studies which repurpose Ravaisson’s crusty 
metaphysics to serve interests in the body, materiality, plasticity, and the transitions between 
natural and made, sentient life and its others.11 “Habit is a second nature” is the essay’s epigraph.12 
Drawn from Aristotle’s On Memory and Reminiscence, it reflects Ravaisson’s more pervasive 
Aristotelianism, including his fundamental account of habit as key to human nature: It is our nature 
or disposition to develop and change our dispositions, and so acquire second natures.13 For 
Ravaisson, habit is also key to understanding the rest of nature, the material. Habit supplies a 
middle term or mediator between freedom and potential on one hand, and mechanical or unfree 
repetition on the other hand – the kind of thing organisms do to pump blood, or what addicts do 
when they follow their sensory compulsions in bad habits.14  
Crucial though not absolute contrasts in Ravaisson’s schema are between active and 
passive, spirit and inorganic matter, and freedom and nature. These pairings are also key to the 
sublime, particularly in post-Kantian thinking. Friedrich Schiller, for instance, explains that the 
sublime shows us “that the condition of our spirit does not necessarily conform to the condition 
of our senses, that the laws of nature are not necessarily also our laws, and that we have an 
autonomous principle within us which is independent of all sensuous feelings [Rührungen].”15 The 
shock of the sublime convinces us of the gap between human nature and nature qua the given and 
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materially determined. In this mode, the eighteenth-century sublime works against or at the 
expense of nature and embodiment.  
The resonances with Ravaisson are unsurprising, as he drew on Kant as well as Aristotle, 
and engaged with a similar problematic. For Ravaisson, the pairings of freedom and nature, activity 
and passivity, relate in turn to what he calls the “double law of habit”:  
The continuity or the repetition of passion weakens it; the continuity or repetition of action 
exalts and strengthens it. Prolonged or repeated sensation diminishes gradually and 
eventually fades away. … Perception, which is linked to [action and] movement, similarly 
becomes clearer, swifter and more certain. (14)  
Passive sensations are weakened by their own repetition, dulling feeling whether emotional or 
sensory, while already relatively superior actions are strengthened by repetition. In both respects, 
however, the resulting habit becomes subconscious, as if involuntary. By extension, no absolute 
distinction exists between automated addictions and compulsions (typically involving sensory 
stimulation), and more free or freeing habits – acquisitions and capacities like playing the piano.16 
For example, certain movements and sensations become automatic for a pianist, allowing her to 
sight-read, or concentrate on expression rather than technique. This is how piano-playing becomes 
second nature, returning from effort and conscious change to norm and mechanism. To acquire 
“perfect execution,” as one eighteenth-century manual puts it, our “fingers” need perfect 
“mechanism.”17 The pianist’s muscle memory means aspects of her movement are automated.  
Ravaisson’s “double law” is key to his philosophical legacy.18 Ravaisson asserts that all 
writers on habit recognize something like it: Habit strengthens perceptions and weakens 
sensations. But, of course, the very divisions of “perception” and “sensation” are historically 
contingent and contestable. Ravaisson’s schema is broadly consonant with enlightenment-era 
idealist hierarchies which placed intellect and activity above sensation, matter, and nature (although 
Ravaisson’s ultimate aim is their reconciliation). More specifically, Ravaisson draws on the vitalist 
Xavier Bichat’s Physiological Researches on Life and Death (1799) and Pierre Maine de Biran’s Influence 
of Habit on the Faculty of Thinking (1802). Bichat saw an “inverse ratio” between the dulling of 
sentiments (feelings) and sharpening of judgements. Both, for him, were cognitive. Feelings involved 
pre-reflective comparisons between past and present impressions, so that a repeated or continuous 
sensation necessarily came to seem less novel and extreme (forming a cognitive baseline, we might 
now say). As pre-reflective comparisons make present sensations less striking, cognitive space 
opens up for more discriminating judgements. Biran rejected this cognitivism, but likewise 
discerned an inverse ratio between the intensity of “sensation” (aligned with what he calls passive 
impressions and pure sensation) and that of “movement” (including active impressions and 
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involving voluntary effort). Biran was working through empiricist, sensualist accounts of the 
formation of consciousness from passive sensation alone – he steps away from sensualism (with 
its threats to human freedom and agency) by distinguishing voluntary effort as the seed of self-
consciousness and higher activities. Although his reasoning differs, Ravaisson follows Biran’s 
contrast of passive sensation (to which he adds passion) versus action and movement. He uses 
Leibnizian concepts of spontaneity, force and inertia to posit an equilibrium established by the 
sense organs when an impression is continuous or repeated.  
The signal importance of dulling sensation, for Ravaisson’s scheme, thus grows from 
enlightenment, post-Lockean attempts to explain sensation and its vexed relationship to 
consciousness and freedom. The emphasis is not apparent in classical discussions of second nature. 
Hints at precursors, however, are discernable in earlier enlightenment thinking about sound; 
turning to them suggests intersections between the sublime and habit, alongside moments of 
friction. 
 
III 
Habit is often imagined through blindness/sight, but deafness/sound also offered compelling 
tropes to enlightenment-era writers. My examples here relate to a family of sounds at the limits of 
audibility, too small or too big to grasp, which challenge fully conscious or masterable experience. 
These sounds approach a vanishing point between the habitual and sublime, invisible white noise 
and the astonishing noise of a raging waterfall or crowd. They would include rustling, roaring, de 
Certeau’s “murmurings” of society and “rumble” of history, even the movements of the spheres.  
Limit sounds are philosophically freighted in ways that resonate with Ravaisson. For G. 
W. Leibniz, they helped to imagine the fact that humans possess “an infinity of perceptions” of 
which we are unaware because they are “too minute”, “too numerous” or “too unvarying.” These 
little perceptions are like the sounds of the “roaring” “sea,” which we must hear even though we 
cannot consciously perceive “each wave”: Without “confused” unconscious perception of each 
“little noise”, “there would be no perception of a hundred thousand waves, since a hundred 
thousand nothings cannot make something”. Leibniz also notes that those living next to a “mill 
or waterfall” forget its noise; yet the mill is still theoretically audible, given proper attentiveness.19 
These passages form part of Leibniz’s defense of his rationalist philosophy against Lockean 
empiricism, where humans are not open to the infinite, but receive only limited, potentially 
distorted, data about the world through finite sense perceptions. 
Before Leibniz, the influential theorist Marin Mersenne had explicitly linked limit sounds 
with second nature in his Traité de l’harmonie universelle (Treatise on Universal Harmony, 1627). He also 
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explicitly formulates what seems to be an early connection between second nature and loss of 
sensation. Treating metaphysics alongside acoustics and physics, Mersenne touches on the classical 
question of why we cannot perceive cosmic music, despite being profoundly influenced by it. This 
must be because cosmic music is  
too large, like those [sounds] of the cataracts of the Nile which deafen the inhabitants of 
Catadupa, if the ancients do not deceive us; or because the concert of the heavens is so 
ravishing that it lulls to sleep and charms our ears; or we are accustomed to that music 
from our mothers’ wombs, and custom is a second nature that robs us of sensation  – just 
as happens to those who live near coppersmiths, blacksmiths, and armorers, for after some 
years they almost no longer hear the noise which at first troubled them.20 
The deafened villagers of Catadupa derive from Cicero’s Dream of Scipio in Republic 6.19, 
preserved in Boethius’ De musica, the ultimate source for early modern images of cosmic music. 
The commonplace about habit is not found in the Dream of Scipio (although Boethius was 
influenced by neo-Platonic concepts of second nature and sound).21 But Mersenne arguably thinks 
of Cicero again when he calls custom a second nature. Cicero had used the phrase twice. In De 
natura deorum 2.60, he praises the cultivation of nature through agriculture: “we seek with our 
human hands to create a sort of second nature [alteram naturam] in the natural world.” More 
pertinent to questions of human cultivation, De finibus 5.74 explains that “habit produces a sort of 
second nature [altera natura], which supplies a motive for many actions not aiming at pleasure at 
all.” In other words, at first, pleasure is the object of desire, but later habit takes over and motivates 
actions without fresh stimulus to direct the will.  
Neither Ciceronian text, however, associates second nature with loss of sensation in the way 
that Mersenne and Ravaisson do. Nor does Aristotle. Aristotle’s On Memory mentions second 
nature in explaining how we come to “naturally” recall things from long ago, by dint of 
remembering them frequently.22 A pseudo-Aristotelean text associated with the phrase in the 
Middle Ages and Renaissance, the Problemata, brings up habit in a discussion of sexual preferences, 
asking why some men come to prefer anal sex as if it were “natural”. The passage is grammatically 
difficult, but seems to propose that submitting to pederasty sometimes becomes habitual: teenage 
boys “therefore desire to do the act by which pleasure and the emission of semen are produced, 
and habit becomes more and more a second nature.”23 The idea of habit dulling sensation is again 
absent: habit excites. 
This leads us back to the sublime, another intense positive experience classically beginning 
when a subject is passive – overwhelmed by what John Dennis called a “pleasing rape.”24 Within 
this discourse, noise is often positioned as new or astonishing and as retaining sensuous impact 
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over time, and indistinct rushing and rustling sounds can be coded as sublime, contributing to 
more fully embodied, situated sublimes than those of Schiller or Kant.25 The sublime, then, 
threatens to undermine the distinction between often negative, weakening, bodily/sensorial 
passivity and positive, strengthening, mental activity. As early as Longinus’s oratorical sublime, 
listeners gain power and elevation by feeling they have spoken what they have only heard 
(Longinus 7.2). They submit to a delusion about agency as well as submitting to a speaker’s 
irresistible power. We also learn to create sublime effects for others by submitting to the models 
of past masters. The sublime, then, shares habit’s keynotes of repetition and practice. Through 
Longinus’s manual or technologia, we go through the motions of experiencing sublime discourse, 
and learn techniques to “sublime” our own speeches. We traditionally imagine nature triumphing 
over art and rules in the sublime, yet Longinus affirms that “art is perfect when it appears like 
nature, nature … successful when it embraces concealed art” (22.1). James Porter’s recent study 
shows just how much Longinus affirms techne (art) as the improver of nature and a guide to making 
natural-seeming art: “to the extent that Longinus’s project aims to instruct aspiring writers in how 
to make their own natures sublime, his work constitutes nothing less than a technology of nature”.26 
Indeed, Porter discerns the workings of second nature in Longinus’s treatise, which “exploit[s]” 
the traditionally blurry division between nature and art as it applies to the apparently natural 
conventions of rhetoric, the “second nature” of representative art, or to humans’ “moral or ethical 
nature”, shaped by “education, taste, [and] habit” (72, 77, 83; compare Longinus 22.1, 32.6).  
The importance of habit and second nature were not lost on eighteenth-century theorists 
of the sublime, despite their emphasis on terrifying nature. For Burke, for instance, the sublime 
force of raging cataracts, roaring crowds, and repeated cannon shots (or even the poetry of Milton) 
are not said to lessen with repeated encounters. In his own use of second nature, Burke moreover 
brings the sublime closer to the habitual than might be expected. It is true that absolutely “constant 
use” or “custom” causes indifference, he writes: “Very justly is use called a second nature; and our 
natural and common state is one of absolute indifference, equally prepared for pain or pleasure” 
(III.5.189–90; compare I.1.41–3). The customary is therefore distant from the “extremely rare and 
uncommon” positive pleasure of beauty (III.5.187). Yet sublimity, by contrast, is neither positively 
pleasurable, nor exactly painful. It lies between pain and indifference, in what Burke calls 
“tranquillity shadowed with horror,” when we still remember and feel the physiological 
reverberations of terror but are returning to a more habitual state (I.3.49).  
The physiological dimension of the sublime is key for Burke. Practicing the sublime 
strengthens our vibrating nerves, which are otherwise liable to convulsions and pathology when 
faced by shock (IV.7.256).27 In its recourse to nerve theory, the treatise allows sound to furnish an 
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implicit model for the sublime’s underlying physiological processes, insofar as sound’s repeated 
striking of the air mirrors the “vibrat[ion]” of the “ear-drum” in hearing, and such vibrations 
mirror our invisible shaking nerves (IV.11.265–6). These comments belong to a chapter on “The 
artificial Infinite” which continues an earlier discussion of infinity. There, Burke conceded that 
“there are scarce any things which can become the objects of our sense that are really … infinite”, 
yet argued that the “effects” of infinity were created for our limited senses by “indefinite” 
repetitions (I.8.129–30). Even after these indefinite stimuli cease, the senses continue the impulses 
by vibrating long after. An illustration tellingly reverses the logic of noise seen earlier:  “After a 
long succession of noises, as the fall of waters, or the beating of forge-hammers, the hammers beat 
and the waters roar in the imagination long after the first sounds have ceased to affect it; and they 
die away at last by gradations which are scarcely perceptible. … The senses, strongly affected in 
some one manner, cannot quickly change their tenor, or adapt themselves … but they continue in 
their old channel” (I.8.130–31). For Mersenne and Leibniz, repetition dulled sensation, leading to 
acquired insensibility to cosmic harmony or infinite tiny waves. For the Lockean empiricist, Burke, 
sensation is extended and intensified in a sublime illusion or impression of an infinity never genuinely 
accessible. This “mechanism” of sensory repetition (a form of inertia) can even become dangerous, 
leading “madmen” to spend “days”, “years” or whole “lives” “in the constant repetition of some 
remark, some complaint, or song” which once “struck [them] powerfully” (I.8.131). In other 
words, sublimity blends into pathological bad habits. 
More broadly, for eighteenth-century writers the fact that the sublime was repeatable 
separated it from novelty or the foolish astonishment of the ignorant.28 Novelty wears off. Sublime 
art keeps its value and even works more intensely the better we know it (compare Longinus 7.3). 
This makes sublimity apparently reconcilable with connoisseurship in discourses on habit, a 
category which exemplified the distinction between sharpened perceptions in good habits or 
skilled practices (the wine-lover) and dulled sensations in addiction (the drunkard) (Ravaisson, 49). 
Yet the sublime would stop being sublime if it became a matter of practiced connoisseurship, of 
experiences “owned” or “mastered” from the outset by a self-possessed subject. Leaving aside the 
problem of alcoholic wine-buffs, a more neutral example of skilled practice sees a person first 
overwhelmed by the scent of beautiful flowers in a meadow, then growing to distinguish each 
scent (Carlisle, 29, discussing Bichat). Such improving powers of sensory distinction fall outside 
most understandings of the sublime. Even for someone like Schiller, for whom the sublime 
plausibly sharpens active perception rather than sensation, and reveals an autonomous spirit free 
from sensations, the sublime must feel overwhelming. No matter how many times we experience 
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it, it must register as a shock to the senses and our natural-mechanical capacities. It thus has at 
least the flavor of taking us beyond the subject, of ex-stasis.  
Schiller does not use the phrase second nature in his essays on the sublime. But he brings to 
a point a key way that this aesthetic creates a second nature, one adumbrated by Longinus: The 
experiences of adversity and terror which trigger the sublime create a second human nature, by 
developing capacities otherwise swamped by our first nature as comfy sensuous beings in a world 
of beautiful appearances. In Schiller’s words, human nature is only an “accidental form of existence” 
until we are completed by “aesthetic education” in the sublime and beautiful. This remakes us as 
“complete citizens of nature, without being her slave” (840). Aesthetic education involves 
practicing resistance to nature, in art. In this sense, art, too, forms a second nature – an arena 
where we practice the moral disposition necessary to “complete citizens of nature.” Longinus had 
already presented a literal contrast between semi-conscious slavery and full political participation 
as the ultimate justification for a sublime rhetorical re-education: Readers need to be jolted out of 
the customs of decadent, undemocratic, mercenary Roman society. Thus a “certain philosopher” 
observes towards the text’s end that “today … we seem in our boyhood to learn the lessons of a 
righteous servitude, being all but enswathed in its customs and observances, when our thoughts 
are yet young and tender, and never tasting the fairest and most productive source of eloquence 
(… I mean freedom), so that we emerge in no other guise than that of sublime flatterers” (44.1–
3). 
The sublime as an educative process which created a second human nature was crucial for 
the critic and philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803). Herder offers thoroughly sonic 
models of the sublime which explicitly involve repetition. According to his late anti-Kantian 
aesthetic treatise Kalligone, the “raw-sublime dreams of our childhood” give way in adulthood to a 
spiritual but also sensuous glimpse of what is “simultaneously the most beautiful and the highest”, 
that is, the true sublime, which Herder sees as the height rather than the antithesis of beauty.29 He 
repeats the narrative of sublime development in the same passage, in an anecdote about the sounds 
of a sea storm, first heard as terrifying, but ultimately perceived as full of rhythmic “pulse” and 
“harmony”, with the manmade ship moving “in unison” with the “elements”, and the world 
responding freely in “sublime … order” to a single aural “call” (3:24–5). Similarly, in his essay 
Cecilia, humans’ natural impulse to sing develops from a dark, raw, privative, confused sublime – 
the kind Burke had made popular – into a truly sublime hymnody which recognizes a beneficent, 
orderly nature. In a state of nature, humans are “surrounded by the monstrous power and 
superiority of creation”, and cry out the hymn: “monstrous power, do not crush me! help me!” But they 
increasingly find in nature “rules of wisdom,” “benignity and mildness”; an “order” that “serves” 
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us, and that we “must serve”. We naturally – second naturally – move to praise the creator of those 
laws and that nature, and in singing are “raise[d]” up to the “highest ideal of creation, to God”.30 
From his earlier essay on the origins of language, it is clear that human development is not simply 
a matter of long-term stadial development, nor of infant development, but of developing our 
analytical understanding of what origins are like through different speculative analogies: Our first 
tendency, in his analysis, is to see brute physical forces and attendant painful sensations at the 
origins of all things; on second thoughts, we see a second element in our nature driving the 
emergence of language, the element of reflection (Besonnenheit).31 
Herder and Schiller suggest that the sublime is not only repetition-resistant, but predicated 
on repetition and habituation. Herder’s emphasis on change particularly chimes with a formulation 
from Ravaisson: Habit involves a “change, with respect to the very change that gave birth to it”, 
so that, “if change is [by definition] transitory, habit subsists beyond the change which brought it 
about” (25). Here, we have “change [in the encounter with sublimity], with respect to the very 
change that gave birth to it”, that is, the encounter with sublimity, which strikes us as a change 
from the ordinary, containable course of things. Herder’s sublime, like habit, is iterative. 
Herder as much as Schiller could be said to privilege “active” perception and reflection 
over sensation. Nonetheless, Kalligone’s aesthetics goes beyond perception, action and control. 
Returning to my earlier image, the true sublime seems less like mastering the piano than like 
learning to imagine the universe as “an odeum, a hall of eternal harmonies,” where every object is 
a corps sonore or “sounding body”, striking other bodies and so “ringing” out, forming 
“consonances” “to an unreachable height and depth,” “to an imperceptible, untraceable degree” 
(1:106, 108). Rather than striking keys, subjects are themselves struck; they reconceive themselves 
as implicated in a system exceeding their reach and perception. 
Herder also illustrates the sonic sublime’s close relationship with repetition per se in the 
long eighteenth century. This went beyond the idea of patterned sounds created by composers and 
perceived by connoisseurs. As is suggested by Herder’s vocabulary of “sounding bodies” – taken 
from contemporary acoustic theory – sound and repetition were linked by the material and acoustic 
“nature” of sound: Bodies vibrating to and fro repeatedly struck the air, and communicated shocks 
to the ear drum and nerves. For Herder, implicitly, this made sound almost constitutively sublime. 
While light in Kalligone is “softly-charming,” sound is “shattering, stirring”; it is “the voice of all moving 
bodies,” “their suffering, their resistance, their aroused powers announcing themselves” (1:101–2). 
 
IV 
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The dynamic between passive “suffering” and active “resistance” in Herder’s phrase suggests once 
more the possible limits of dividing the beginnings of habit into (higher) active perception and 
(lower) passive sensation, as Ravaisson did. This hierarchical division is of course unfashionable 
today. Now, amid critiques of human pretensions to mastery or to supersensuous, non-situated 
knowledge, the sublime is nonetheless making a small ecocritical comeback which again links 
sublimity with second nature, albeit in an altered sense. Second nature now describes less human 
nature, society, or art, than a physical environment which – like a cataract or thundering storm – 
threatens us with destructive power, but which is “second natural” in being indelibly shaped by 
capital, industry, technology or other human interventions.32 In the Anthropocene, we might say, 
all natural threats look second natural. 
One brief illustration comes from Damien Hirst, whose well-known installations-cum-
sculptures have been suggestively interpreted alongside the sublime by Luke White. A good 
example is The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living (1991) – an immense 
white steel vitrine housing a shark preserved in formaldehyde – linked by White with eighteenth-
century depictions of sharks as natural threat par excellence.33 Suspended in the blue-tinted medium, 
Hirst’s shark seems to be swimming, jaws and eyes wide open, towards something it will never 
reach, bringing viewers to the double aporia of the shark’s death and their own. Both these deaths 
are real (in different ways), and both imaginatively implausible, thanks to the second nature of the 
artwork, and to death’s resistance to thought, part of the second nature of mental conventions and 
illusions which sustains our everyday habits. Refraction means that the shark can seem to be 
swimming at us twice, through different faces of the vitrine, and so seems “non-identical” with 
itself – a characteristic Adorno linked with the sublime, although, as White notes, Adorno thought 
this aesthetic had come to the end of its natural life by the 1960s. White links Hirst’s work with 
the late-capitalist, media-saturated repurposing of the shark as a symbol of human predatoriness. 
But in a world whose oceans are now suffused with invisible microplastics, it is increasingly easy 
to read the formaldehyde-saturated shark as “second natural” in a more literal and 
environmentalist sense. Another piece from the same year, The Acquired Inability to Escape (1991), 
suggests Hirst’s interests in second nature in the related senses of habit, addiction, and 
enculturation. The work comprises a black steel vitrine suggestive of prison bars, holding a 
functionalist office chair and desk, a cigarette and full ashtray. The psycho-physiological “inability” 
of the smoker to escape her habit neatly rhymes with the inability of the worker to escape an office 
job – metonymically represented by the space of the office – which nothing but social and cultural 
conditioning (and a big steel vitrine) would make it impossible to leave.  
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The artificial, invisible, yet ever-present limits of Urizen, The Truman Show, or Hirst’s shark 
cage all function as critiques of second nature, and all trope culture as physical space. In the last 
lines of Urizen, desolate yet hopeful, the “remaining children of Urizen” see “their brethren shrink 
together / Beneath the Net of Urizen.” Unable to reach and awaken their “wither’d, & deafen’d” 
“ears” – lacking the sublime oratory Longinus hoped could pierce Roman habits of slavery – the 
chosen few “left the pendulous earth: / They called it Egypt, & left it. / And the salt ocean rolled 
englob’d” (Plate 28, ch. 9, ll. 20, 12–13, 15–16, 18, 21–23). We do not have the option of leaving 
our “earth”, neither the second nature of the Anthropocene nor our acquired human natures. If 
Ravaisson offers any hope in the contemporary moment, it is perhaps the reminder that habits are 
not only permanent residues of changes wrought in and by humans, but that “habit remains for a 
change which either is no longer or is not yet; it remains for a possible change” (25).34 The practice 
of the sublime, if we have any taste for it today, might be a prompt for such change, but not 
plausibly because it simply escapes habit and culture.  
Notwithstanding the persistence of the sublime, critics now not infrequently recoil from it 
as an aesthetic which harvests one man’s pleasure from others’ pain and exploitation – be that the 
enjoyment of a shipwreck (Lucretius), the appreciation of a stylish murder (De Quincey), or the 
more insidious conversion of nature into a spectacle exploited by a distanced, masterful subject. 
Dodsley’s impressions of Piercefield in 1759, with which this article began, open another 
perspective on the ethical terrors of the sublime. The estate of Piercefield had been bought in 1743 
by Valentine Morris’s father, with a fortune made in Caribbean sugar plantations. A few decades 
later, an impoverished Morris was forced to sell the property and move to the Carribean himself. 
On St Vincent, wrote another visitor to Piercefield, William Coxe, Morris “distinguished himself 
with so much zeal and activity in promoting the cultivation of the island, where he almost raised 
another Piercefield, that he was soon after nominated governor. … he considerably improved his 
fortune, and had almost repaired his losses, when the island, for the defence of which he advanced 
considerable sums, was taken by the French.”35 Writing in the midst of the Revolutionary wars, 
Coxe saw a different sting in the twists and turns of Morris’s fortune than that which we likely see 
today. The staging of sublime nature at Piercefield relied not only on the concealed work of 
landscaping, but on the distant labor of Caribbean slaves. The second nature of this Welsh estate 
was emulated in a second second nature at St Vincent, made “almost … another Piercefield” tacitly 
through more slave labor.  
This is perhaps familiar territory in critiques of eighteenth-century aesthetics: allegedly 
natural scenes are cultivated; familiar sublime scenes rely on networks of distant and unfamiliar 
places; disinterested aesthetics relies on interested economies and denaturalizing exploitation of 
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people and land. But attention to sound here may suggest slightly different directions. Dodsley’s 
impression of the natural “Amphitheatre” at Piercefield, where gun-shot holds a dialogue with its 
reverberations from the rocks, has interesting resonances with Herder’s impressions of sound. For 
Kalligone, the everyday workings of sound revealed the universe as an “odeum” – another classical 
space for musical performances – connecting all bodies with each other in infinitely complex 
relationships and reverberations. Herder is certainly no ethical paragon, but his writing, alongside 
others’ touched on here, suggests the continuing affordances of eighteenth-century aesthetics. The 
vibrations and resonances fundamental to sound can construct a sublime that is irreducibly 
relational, setting the auditor in a participatory network of bodies and spaces. The practice of 
listening here becomes a techne of the sublime – an art which strives to look like an encounter with 
nature, and which aims to remake our natures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This article took shape at “Habits and Spirits” (King’s College London, 2016), convened by 
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